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 1 
From the Obama Doctrine to America First: The erosion of the Washington 
consensus on grand strategy 
 
Abstract: 
This article explores the social construction of American grand strategy as nexus of 
identity and national security. The article first highlights how the identity construct of 
American exceptionalism has underwritten a grand strategy of global leadership and 
military interventionism since the end of the Cold War, constituting liberal hegemony as 
dominant position within the bipartisan US foreign policy establishment. The article then 
explores the political impact of counter-hegemonic discourses of restraint and offshore 
balancing under the Obama presidency. It argues that in ‘leading from behind’ the Obama 
Doctrine represented a moderate intra-elite challenge to the status quo. Obama’s use of 
exceptionalist rhetoric to legitimate restraint simultaneously exposed the political limits 
of this strategic paradigm shift, which oscillated between continuity and change. Finally, 
the article examines Trump’s ‘America First’ stance, concluding that its combination of 
nationalism, nativism and protectionism has resulted in the erosion of the Washington 
consensus on liberal hegemony. 
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In April 2016, the magazine Atlantic featured the ‘Obama Doctrine’ on its cover. 
President Obama used this popular media outlet to once again place his foreign policy 
course between ‘internationalism’ and ‘realism’, laying out an American grand strategy 
of engaged multilateralism and military restraint (Goldberg 2016). At the same time, 
Obama declared that in 2013 over Syria, he had finally thrown out a ‘Washington 
playbook’ of intervening militarily to demonstrate American resolve to the world. The 
American president pointedly criticized the US foreign policy establishment and 
Washington think tank scene for fetishizing American credibility abroad and militarizing 
US policy responses (Goldberg 2016). The criticism of the ‘Obama Doctrine’ by large 
segments of that same Washington establishment in turn, reached a highpoint over the 
aborted plan to launch US air strikes against the Assad regime, and the caveated ‘no boots 
on the ground’ intervention against ISIS that began in September 2014 (Cohen 2015, 
Dueck 2015, Gerson 2014, Lieber 2016).  
 
Prominent media pundits, foreign policy experts, neoconservative hawks, and liberal 
interventionists accused Obama of following a strategic vision that lead the United States 
into retreat and undermined a liberal, international order of American origin (Kagan 
2014). Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, came into office promoting a protectionist and 
non-interventionist foreign policy under the neo-isolationist slogan America First (White 
House 2017), which appeared as even more radical departure from America’s established 
role as the world’s liberal hegemon (Cohen 2017).  
 
This article seeks to make two principal contributions to the understanding of American 
grand strategy. First, it argues that the meaning of grand strategy extends beyond a 
rational calculation and equation of means and ends to produce national security against 
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external threats (Kennedy 1991); it also constitutes a sense of national identity and 
provides confirmation about the nation’s role and position in world politics linking 
discourse and practice (Croft 2006, Hansen 2006). Grand strategy thus attains its relevant 
political and social status through the interaction of elite networks, responsible for 
constructing a legitimate discourse of national security and world politics through 
invoking common sense, formal expertise and political authority (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 
1998, 4-5). Second, on the empirical level, the article undertakes a detailed examination 
of the internal fragmentation of the American foreign policy establishment under the 
Obama presidency, which undermined a longstanding Washington consensus on national 
security and challenged the strategic vision of liberal hegemony on both ideational and 
practical grounds (Posen 2014, 5).  
 
In the following segments, the article will first demonstrate how, since the end of the Cold 
War, the dominant elite discourse of American grand strategy was constructed around the 
idea of American exceptionalism and the political practices in US national security policy 
linked to this identity discourse. The article will then examine how under the Obama 
presidency, the bipartisan Washington consensus on liberal hegemony was challenged 
within the strategic community of national security think tanks and foreign policy experts 
by countering arguments for restraint and offshore balancing, exposing a widening rift 
over the big picture of grand strategy among competing elite producers of discourse. 
Finally, the article will demonstrate how Obama’s strategic adjustment towards ‘leading 
from behind’ challenged the Washington consensus of grand strategy from the ‘inside’, 
while Trump initiated a more radical paradigm shift from the ‘outside’ that threatened the 
continued political relevance of the US foreign policy establishment.  
  
Grand Strategy in International Relations 
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Conventionally understood, a grand strategy envisions how a state can best use its various 
resources of power, - military, economic, diplomatic – to achieve national security, thus 
establishing a guideline for the national interest. (Art 2003, Brands 2014, Martel 2015). 
As the realist scholar Barry Posen has summed up this view, prevailing in the majority of 
the academic literature on the subject: ‘A grand strategy is a nation state’s theory about 
how to produce security for itself’ (Posen 2014, 1). Realist scholars have provided an 
enduring categorization of grand strategy options, ranging from unipolar primacy to 
selective engagement and (neo)-isolationism. 1  A growing body of literature in 
International Relations (IR) has sought to widen interpretive insights from grand strategy 
analysis, beyond a realist emphasis on material power calculations and an aggregated 
national interest. Instead, the intellectual focus has shifted on how domestic actors, 
institutional processes, political ideologies, elite networks and official rhetoric shape the 
‘big picture’ of grand strategy and its political effects (Apeldoorn and Graaf 2015, 
Goddard and Krebs 2015).  
 
Conceptualizing grand strategy as nexus of geopolitical identity and national security 
combines constructivist approaches that focus on the writing and re-writing of identity as 
key performative function of foreign policy and international security (Campbell 1992, 
Huysmans 1998) with more practice-oriented perspectives on the political operation and 
policy effects of grand strategy (Dombrowski and Reich 2017). Deep-seated and widely 
shared representations of world history, national identity and international affairs are 
regularly used to authorize and legitimate national security practices, which in turn 
confirm or challenge the underlying identity discourse, which enables these practices. 
The grand strategy vision of liberal hegemony, for example, the default position taken by 
the US foreign policy establishment, links the dominant identity construct of American 
 5 
exceptionalism and indispensability to the material reality of US military supremacy and 
security practices such as the forward basing of US troops in Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East, the global projection of military power and America’s command of the global 
commons (Brooks 2013).  
 
The use of these ideational constructs, at the same time, creates political expectations 
within the foreign policy establishment, elite networks and the wider public that the 
chosen means reconfirm the underlying identity discourse (Neumann & Coe 2012). If the 
established identity construct is contested rather than confirmed by national security 
policies, such as the 2011 ‘leading from behind’ intervention in Libya, or Obama’s 
turnaround on militarily intervening in Syria, this affects the political credibility of the 
grand strategy discourse, which can no longer provide the narrative of national orientation 
and political coherence and consistency it is supposed to perform (Balz and Craighill 
2013). The American strategist William Martel has commented that ‘fundamentally, 
grand strategy describes a broad consensus on the state’s goals and the means by which 
to put them into practice’ (Martel 2015, 359). The level of influence of a grand strategy 
discourse can therefore be gauged through its reproduction as authoritative and legitimate 
by a multitude of influential sources, ranging from government officials to policy experts 
and leading media. It is this intertextuality that establishes the grand strategy consensus 
as dominant ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1991), with foreign policy makers referencing 
other texts and discourses while ‘seeking to establish their own discourse as hegemonic’ 
(Hansen 2006, 215). As Christopher Layne has argued, American grand strategy is the 
product of a networked, elite-class foreign policy establishment in the United States, 
which exercises ‘discourse dominance’ and thus guarantees the strategic continuity of 
American primacy (Layne 2017). Under Obama, however, the discursive dominance of 
the ‘Washington playbook’ started to erode. An intense intra-elite contest occurred 
 6 
between establishment insiders, like the neoconservative scholar Robert Kagan, who 
defended the status quo of liberal hegemony against ‘misguided’ and ‘isolationist’ critics 
(Kagan 2014), and outsiders like Andrew Bacevich, who targeted the imperialist hubris 
of Washington and challenged the prevailing elite consensus of national security through 
the advocacy of restraint (Bacevich 2010). At the heart of this confrontation was a battle 
over the meaning of American exceptionalism for US national security.  
 
American exceptionalism and the Washington consensus on liberal hegemony  
 
American exceptionalism stresses the uniqueness of the national character and world 
political role of the United States as objective truth and legitimate guideline for political 
action in international affairs (Gilmore, Sheets, and Rowling, 2016). 2  While never 
uncontested by competing discourses, it represents a dominant identity construct that is 
embedded in the mainstream of political rhetoric, intellectual expertise and popular 
culture, and thus acceptable to subsequent generations of Americans as a national Self-
making resource (Ceaser 2012). The singularity, superiority and ‘God-favored’ status of 
the United States accordingly feature as dominant themes in political discourse, for 
example, in the annual State of the Union addresses given by US presidents (Gilmore 
2014).  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US foreign policy establishment had continuously 
linked this geopolitical identity discourse to a strategic vision that legitimated military 
interventions abroad, supported the unrivalled, global supremacy of American power and 
influence, and sought the country’s enduring hegemony in the international system.3 As 
Feaver and Brands have summed up this strategic default position: “Every president since 
George H.W. Bush has committed the United States to maintaining American global 
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primacy, and to deepening and expanding the liberal international order that took hold 
after the Second World War” (Brands and Feaver 2016, 95). In following a grand strategy 
of liberal hegemony, the United States aimed to use its political influence, military power 
and economic weight to deter potential aggressors and preserve regional stability, foster 
the global spread of democracy, uphold the international rule of law, and guarantee free 
trade and open access to the global commons in support of a globalized economy (Rudolf 
2016). Liberal hegemony thus entailed both the primacy of American power that was to 
be perpetuated, and an activist political leadership role in support of Western liberalism 
that reflected America’s own sense of its national exceptionalism (Posen 2014, 5-6).  
 
Given this political dominance, cultural embeddedness and historic longevity, it is 
unsurprising that under the Obama presidency, American exceptionalism, global 
leadership and military preeminence remained at the center of US grand strategy. In the 
foreword to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2015, for example, president Obama 
reiterated: “Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based 
international order (…). The question is not whether America should lead, but how we 
lead (White House 2015).” The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010 
unequivocally stated that the United States remained the ‘only nation able to project and 
sustain large-scale operations over extended distances,’ resulting in America’s unique 
responsibility for global leadership (DoD 2010, 1). The ‘exceptional’ character of 
American military power, - its indispensability, superiority, and singular global reach, as 
referenced in Obama’s speeches and statements, the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review reports, or the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) underwrote the strategic 
vision of liberal hegemony both materially and rhetorically. This reconfirmed the basic 
tenets of the bipartisan Washington consensus on national security and foreign policy 
(Brooks 2013). At the conservative of the spectrum, the proponents of American 
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hegemony emphasized unilateral action, the pre-emptive use of military power against 
threats to US national security, and the perpetuation of the unipolar primacy of the United 
States (Mead 2002). Under Obama, this strategic vision of liberal imperialism and 
unilateral primacy remained most closely associated with the establishment of the 
Republican Party (Romney 2010) and neoconservative intellectuals (Kagan 2012).  
 
The liberal discourse of hegemony favored by Democrats in contrast stressed how the 
global leadership role of the United States functioned as integral and essential part of a 
global institutional framework with a preference for US foreign policy to operate 
multilaterally and in support of international cooperation (Slaughter 2013). Nonetheless, 
the underlying key assumption was that the United States had a unique leadership 
responsibility in these cooperative arrangements. As liberal hegemon, the United States 
was expected to take the lead in global political agenda setting, management of the world 
economy and sponsorship of international security (Reich and Lebow 2014). The US 
would also act unilaterally, including with military force, if necessary to maintain the 
Washington-led liberal order and defend its core values. As Obama made clear:  “America 
must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will” (Obama 2014). 
Although often clad in the rhetoric of cooperative security, engagement and mutual 
partnership, this discourse actually represented a hybrid form of hegemonic engagement, 
where the United Stats acted as indispensable partner, but never quite as an equal in the 
international system (Haass 2017). The bi-partisan Washington consensus elevated the 
discourse of liberal hegemony to the status of a political mantra. Assertions of American 
indispensability in world affairs accordingly appeared in speeches and statements of 
otherwise such diverse political figures as Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, Chris Christie, Jeb 
Bush, Bobby Jindal, Marco Rubio, and Michelle Bachman (Zenko, 2014) and were a 
mainstay of both foreign policy expertise and media coverage. Obama’s own 
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interpretation of hegemony thus largely operated within an established historic, political 
and ideological continuity, reconfirming the exceptionalist identity of the United States 
as unique, superior to and qualitatively different from other nations.  
 
Grand strategy expertise and the rotating door  
 
The political validity and normative quality of the Washington consensus on grand 
strategy were only rarely questioned within the foreign policy establishment, as the 
strategic community of think tanks demonstrates. Ranging from decidedly conservative 
organizations, such as Heritage (Wood 2016), to the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution 
(O’Hanlon 2013), and the center-right Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) (Green 2012), leading policy research organizations continuously emphasized 
American military preeminence as necessary foundation for global security in their 
research outputs and assorted publications under the Obama presidency. While individual 
policy proposals varied, - for example, between Heritage and Brookings on offsetting or 
limiting defense budget sequestration, or between Brookings and CSIS on the appropriate 
size of the military component in the US rebalancing to Asia-, these variations did not 
signal a fundamental dispute about the global leadership role of the United States.  
 
Part of the considerable political relevance of think tanks stems from the fact that their 
individual experts have spent time as part of a presidential administration, offering 
valuable personal connections and practical experience, or will re-enter government at a 
later point, which allows them to transfer their knowledge and research expertise into 
their respective future government functions. This ‘rotating door’ principle directly 
connects the spheres of government and policy expertise, reinforcing intertextual links of 
converging discourses in the production of knowledge with the practical intersection of 
 10 
professional career paths in the national security establishment (Parmar 2009). The 
influential Center for a New American Security (CNAS), for example, enjoyed a 
particular close connection to the Obama White House.4 On grand strategy, the research 
produced by CNAS formulated a vision of hegemonic engagement that focused on 
improving the effectiveness of US military power, but never questioned its 
indispensability for maintaining a liberal world order (Brimley and Flournoy 2008, 
Fontaine and Lord 2012). As CNAS itself stated: 
 
 (…) there is little that is fundamentally new in a strategy emphasizing the very 
theme and currents that lie deep within American history and the bipartisan 
exercise of statecraft over man decades. (Brimley, Flournoy, and Singh 2008, 17).  
 
This statement further testifies to the strong ideological crossover that linked Republicans 
and Democrats, conservative and centrist think tanks and policy experts in supporting the 
Washington consensus on hegemony. In reproducing the basic identity-policy link of 
American exceptionalism and military primacy, most national security experts could 
therefore only provide a limited bandwidth of opinion on actual grand strategy 
alternatives. This position of ideological and discursive dominance within the political, 
expert and media class in Washington DC in turn considerably limited the political room 
to maneuver and to recast the status quo. Even a modest strategic adjustment as 
represented in the ‘Obama Doctrine’ thus triggered a considerable establishment backlash 
in response.   
 
Restraint and the stigma of isolationism 
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The expert consensus on liberal hegemony and firm belief in America’s necessary role as 
the world’s ‘indispensable nation’ translated into overwhelming political support for an 
expansive and costly global security posture and military apparatus that critics challenged 
on both practical and ideational grounds (Walt 2011a, Preble, 2015). Advocates of 
restraint argued that Americans should disentangle their belief in the nation’s 
exceptionalism from a conviction in the wisdom of global military primacy and 
interventionism (Bacevich 2014). This intra-elite critique and questioning of the identity-
policy link of American exceptionalism and liberal hegemony was formulated by deviant 
insiders of the wider Washington foreign policy establishment, not radical critics of US 
imperialism or traditionally subjugated voices existing at the fringes. It nonetheless 
remained an outlier and outsider’s view, which existed on the margins of acceptable elite 
opinion. This was predominantly due to the stigma of ‘isolationism’, which was actively 
invoked by American primacists in leading US media to discredit strategic ideas of non-
interventionism and offshore balancing. Senators Joe Lieberman and Jon Kyl, for 
example, invoked the dangers of isolationism in a bipartisan plea against sequester-
induced defense cuts in the Washington Post (Lieberman and Kyl, 2013). In the New York 
Times the historian Bill Keller attacked the American public’s reluctance for military 
engagement of Assad’s Syria explaining: “Isolationism is not just an aversion to war  (…). 
It is a broader reluctance to engage, to assert responsibility, to commit” (Keller, 2013). 
When a much-reported Pew research poll in 2013 found that 52% of Americans agreed 
that ‘the U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get 
along the best they can on their own,’ the Washington Post featured the results under the 
alarmist headline: “American isolationism just hit a 50-year high. Why that matters.” 
(Fisher 2013). The stigmatization of restraint as negative, timid or amoral in elite media 
outlets like the Washington Post or New York Times attempted to influence public 
opinion, resulting in a national security debate that was supposed to revolve around the 
 12 
appropriate ways and means to manage American hegemony, not its replacement with an 
altogether alternative grand strategy.5  
 
The attempt to sideline or discredit the ‘isolationist’ ideas of the libertarian Cato Institute, 
the neo-realist Stephen Walt or libertarian conservatives like Rand Paul meant that 
proponents of primacy within the Washington foreign policy establishment viewed 
domestic critics as considerable threat to US national security. According to many 
prominent and influential supporters of liberal hegemony, American world leadership and 
global security were a question of national willpower; unless Americans could be 
convinced domestically of the virtues of US leadership, the international order was likely 
to disintegrate and collapse with devastating consequences for the US itself (Kagan 2014, 
Lieber 2016). The external threats of a rising China, a revisionist Russia or international 
terrorism were treated as significant and controversial issues in the American grand 
strategy debate under Obama regarding the appropriate nature of US policy responses 
(White House 2015). The fundamental nature of the geopolitical role of the United States 
as the ‘world’s global constabulary’ (Preble 2015), however, was more directly 
challenged internally by proposals that demanded a fundamental strategic reorientation 
of the domestic political consensus on US foreign policy.  
 
A counter-hegemonic discourse of restraint was supported by a heterogeneous coalition 
of libertarian conservatives (Preble 2009), progressive critics of American foreign policy 
(vanden Heuvel 2018), and neorealist IR scholars (Posen 2014), which advocated the 
retrenchment of US power to varying degrees.6 Realist foreign policy experts in particular 
proposed a grand strategy of ‘offshore balancing’ and ‘non-interventionism,’ where the 
United States would withdraw its forces from the Middle East and Central Asia and 
husband its military and economic resources more carefully in the future, while 
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maintaining the ability to project decisive military power overseas in order to determine 
the balance of power in key geostrategic regions such as Western Europe and East Asia 
(Mearsheimer 2010, Layne 2012, Walt 2011b). According to this diverse set of deviant 
establishment voices, the existing strategic paradigm of global primacy and liberal 
hegemony had overextended American commitments, squandered financial and military 
resources through frequent military intervention, and triggered regional instability, 
fuelling anti-Americanism through ill-fated attempts at democracy export and forced 
regime change.  
 
In opposing both the underlying identity construct and associated policy options of the 
Washington consensus on grand strategy, the restraint discourse questioned its seemingly 
self-evident, normative status and instead presented American hegemony as ideologically 
driven political choice that was not in the national interest.7 As an alternative grand 
strategy, however, restraint never fully materialized beyond its relatively small circle of 
supporters. The cautious, pragmatic and deliberately un-idealistic vision of America’s 
role in the world ‘offshore balancing’ outlined, crucially lacked the high level of 
discursive intertextuality that legitimated liberal hegemony as common sense position of 
political rhetoric, intellectual expertise, and mainstream media coverage.8 The bias of 
elite opinion in America’s leading think tanks and newspapers, at the same time, 
demonstrated the substantial hurdles president Obama faced in reorienting the status quo 
of American grand strategy and to establish the Obama Doctrine as authoritative and 
legitimate in the public realm.  
 
The Obama Doctrine: ‘Leading from Behind’ 
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From the onset of his presidency, Obama attempted to reconcile singular representations 
of America’s world political role as ‘exceptional’ and ‘indispensable’ with a foreign 
policy course of cooperative engagement and ‘burden sharing’, highlighting the 
limitations of US power and influence (Obama 2009). This strategic shift would maintain 
American hegemony at less cost, both financially and militarily. Yet, it also challenged 
the existing identity-policy link that translated exceptionalist sentiments about American 
identity at home into regular calls for military action abroad. At the highest level of 
strategy making, Obama linked the lessons of the failed military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan into a political maxim that the United States should avoid making ‘stupid’ 
mistakes, resulting from moral absolutism, exceptionalist hubris and a misguided faith in 
military solutions to complex geopolitical problems (Goldberg 2016, 73). As Mark 
Stoddart, has pointed out, referring to the work by Gramsci, and Laclau and Mouffe on 
hegemony and discourse: “Hegemony is always contested; we may only speak of the 
relative success of a particular hegemonic discourse” (Stoddart 2007, 208). While Obama 
charted a strategic course that sought to align more limited means with less ambitious 
goals, his continued reliance on the identity construct of American exceptionalism to 
legitimate this policy produced a persistent disconnect between rhetoric and action 
(Chollet 2016) that exposed the Obama Doctrine to charges of inconsistency. The 
conceptual gap between identity and policy was most prominent in the president’s use of 
force. In ‘leading from behind’ in Libya, surging and, at the same time, announcing to 
withdraw in Afghanistan, and setting up, but failing to militarily enforce ‘red lines’ in 
Syria, Obama’s policies seemed to question, not confirm, America’s singular 
exceptionalism and the country’s unique role as liberal hegemon.  
 
Rather than facilitating public support through persuasion, the contradiction between the 
ambitious rhetoric of American exceptionalism and a policy course of limited 
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engagement and military restraint exposed the limits of Obama’s strategic adjustment. 
The discrepancy in the discourse undermined the political credibility of Obama’s course 
both at home and abroad (Balz and Craighill 2013, Inboden 2014) and provoked 
widespread criticism of Obama’s passivity and weakness, not only in Republican circles, 
but also among elite media outlets and liberal interventionists in the Democratic Party. 
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State during Obama’s first term and presidential nominee of 
the Democratic Party in 2016, publicly rebuked Obama’s strategic caution after leaving 
office in 2014 declaring: “Don’t do stupid stuff is not an organizing principle.” (Goldberg 
2016, 73). When Obama’s foreign policy speechwriter and deputy national security 
advisor Ben Rhodes attacked the groupthink of the Washington foreign policy ‘Blob’ for 
its intellectual laziness and ignorance towards nuance and detail (Samuels 2016), - a 
derogatory label under which Rhodes included Clinton, Robert Gates and supporters of 
the Iraq War in both parties as well as foreign policy experts, think tanks and elite media 
outlets like the Washington Post and the New Yorker -, his criticism directly targeted the 
identity-policy nexus of American exceptionalism and the militarization of US foreign 
policy Obama would increasingly  try to counteract over the course of his presidency.  
 
All American presidents since the end of the Cold War encountered the difficulty to 
formulate a coherent and consistent American grand strategy in the absence of an 
overarching threat perception, such as the Soviet Union, while attempting to reconcile 
contradictory impulses emerging from America’s main foreign policy traditions (Mead 
2002).9 Yet, regarding the prevailing identity-policy nexus, all post-Cold War American 
grand strategies, - from George H. W. Bush’s ‘New World Order’ and Bill Clinton’s 
‘Engagement and Enlargement’ strategy to George W. Bush’s emphasis on unilateralism 
and pre-emption -, represented mere variations of the theme of liberal hegemony, securing 
and expanding US leadership and national security within an international system defined 
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by liberal democracy and capitalism. Within this strategic continuity, Obama’s emphasis 
on lessening costs and commitments signaled a more significant departure from the post-
Cold War Washington consensus in both discourse and practice than his predecessors, 
resulting in a more vehement criticism by US foreign policy experts about its lacking 
coherence and consistency and its acceptance of American decline (Kagan 2014).  
 
In both the New York Times and Washington Post, prominent critics found Obama’s 
public candor, including his disdain for the Washington establishment voiced in the 
Atlantic itself ‘destabilizing’ (Ignatius 2016), and ‘depressing’ for articulating doubts 
about the efficacy of American power and liberal interventionism (Cohen 2016). In the 
Wall Street Journal, the conservative historian Niall Ferguson attacked the ‘Obama 
Doctrine’ and its vision of a less hegemonic United States for ‘failing disastrously’ 
(Ferguson 2015). Both neoconservative (Krauthammer 2014) and liberal internationalist 
(Judis 2014) critics saw Obama’s emphasis of military restraint as dangerous weakness. 
Obama was perceived as too naïve to counter aggressive great powers like Russia and 
China, and as too passive to enforce human rights through military intervention. This 
criticism was returned in kind by the Obama administration and its dismissal of the US 
foreign policy establishment ‘Blob’ and the often-hyperbolic rhetoric and ‘threat 
inflation’ cultivated inside the Washington DC media bubble (Samuels 2016). Travelling 
to Asia in April 2014, president Obama famously used a baseball analogy to defend the 
Obama Doctrine: 
 
You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a home 
run. That may not always be sexy. That may not always attract a lot of attention, and 
it doesn’t make for good argument on Sunday morning shows. But we steadily 
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advance the interests of the American people and our partnership with folks around 
the world (Landler 2014). 
 
The president’s strategic vision was more caveated, more appreciative of the complexity 
of world politics, and less simplistic in its characterization of American power and what 
it could achieve on the world stage (Obama 2014). This set Obama apart, not only from 
conservative proponents of unchecked American primacy in the Republican party 
(Romney 2010), but also the Democratic standard bearers of liberal hegemony and 
military interventionism, Hillary Clinton first among them. Clinton was a firm believer 
in America’s role as the world’s ‘indispensable nation’ whose opposition to Obama was 
both politically and ideologically motivated (Teague Beckwith 2016).  
 
Obama’s failure to legitimate a new strategic consensus on America’s role in the world 
in the public realm exposed both the policy constraints set by an existing hegemonic 
identity discourse and the limits practical modifications could achieve to reorient grand 
strategy without being accompanied by a reformulated overarching vision to embed these 
policy changes in a new conceptual paradigm. The inability to coherently link the identity 
and policy dimensions of the Obama Doctrine, however, were mostly rooted in structural 
inconsistencies, given that restraint only ever formed part of Obama’s strategic vision, 
and was never considered as a holistic and encompassing strategy of disengagement or 
offshore balancing as, for example, demanded by critics like Walt (2011b) or Bacevich 
(2010). This was also emphasized by Obama’s signature counter-terrorism policy of 
drone strikes, which escalated military attacks on suspected terrorist targets in Pakistan, 
Yemen and other places, allowing US forces to operate with invulnerability, while 
violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations in the process. 10 
Ultimately, in reorienting US foreign and security policy Obama acted as a transitional 
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rather than a transformative figure, whose moderate strategic adjustment would be 
overshadowed by the more radical departure of his successor’s America First stance. 
 
Donald Trump and ‘America First’  
 
President Trump’s impulsive behavior and often-contradictory policies and statements 
make identification of an actual Trump Doctrine difficult. Furthermore, at the time of 
writing Trump has only been in office for just over two years. Nonetheless, from the 
discursive performance of ‘America First’ and its policy manifestations so far, it can be 
argued that Trump’s populist vision presents the most significant internal challenge to the 
post-Cold War Washington consensus on liberal hegemony to date. 
 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump, a real estate mogul and TV celebrity had 
carefully cultivated an image as the quintessentially Washington outsider, placing himself 
outside the foreign policy mainstream by advocating a nativist, protectionist, and 
nationalist-isolationist vision for the United States, under the populist slogan ‘America 
First’ (Trump 2016a). Once in office, Trump enacted a series of policies that 
corresponded to this strategic vision, from declaring a ban on immigration from majority 
Muslim countries, to imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from China and 
close US partners (including Canada, Japan, the EU and Mexico), justified on national 
security grounds, to withdrawing from several key international agreements considered 
signature achievements of Obama’s cooperative approach to US foreign and security 
policy, including the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), the Paris climate change 
accord, and the Iran nuclear deal (Kagan 2018).  
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The perception of a breakdown of the established identity-policy nexus of American 
grand strategy is also reconfirmed by the wholesale denunciation of Trump’s rhetoric and 
policies by the collective US foreign policy establishment, a fundamental critique that 
went beyond previous attacks on Obama’s ‘leading from behind’ stance. Both Republican 
and Democratic foreign policy and national security experts (Glasser 2018), leading 
Washington think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations (Patrick 2018) and national 
and international elite media outlets from the Atlantic to the Financial Times (Frum 2017, 
Wolf 2017) attacked Trump for ‘abdicating global leadership and retreating into narrow-
minded nationalism’ (Lee 2018). These critics viewed Trump as genuine threat to the 
survival of a liberal world order and the geopolitical cohesion of the West due to his long-
standing ideological hostility towards free trade, US alliances and international 
cooperation that according to Trump had disadvantaged the United States to the benefit 
of other nations for decades.  
 
At the same time, key foreign policy ideas voiced by Trump, as, for example, on the 
strategic miscalculation of the Iraq War or the need for greater ‘burden sharing’ in NATO 
echoed realist ideas for offshore balancing and continued the growing strategic 
momentum for restraint that had begun under the Obama presidency (Byman 2017). 
Similar to Obama, Trump indicated that US power and influence were not unlimited, 
declaring in September 2016 that: “At some point, we cannot be the policeman of the 
world” (Trump 2016b); an almost word for word a repetition of Obama’s rhetorical stance 
in his televised address on Syria three years prior (Obama 2013). As presidential 
candidate Trump had also called the NATO alliance ‘obsolete,’ and suggested that the 
United States could withdraw its troops from South Korea and Japan, resulting in these 
countries providing for their own defense independently (Trump 2016b). Once in office, 
Trump’s repeated public reprimands of European partners for failing the NATO spending 
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target of 2 per cent of GDP on defense were supported by realist critics as overdue 
pushback against alliance freeriding (Walt 2017), which Obama had likewise criticized 
albeit with more diplomatic language and in less dramatic fashion (Goldberg 2016). Both, 
Obama and Trump thus challenged the prevailing American grand strategy discourse 
through their respective advocacy of restraint.  
 
Obama, however, attempted to modify American grand strategy still within an established 
identity paradigm of American exceptionalism and liberal hegemony that broadly 
reflected the views of the country’s political elites, leading national security experts and 
mainstream media. Trump established a new populist discourse outside that elite 
consensus that resulted in a more profound paradigm shift. Trump’s ideas on foreign and 
security policy, immigration and the economy seem to primarily reflect the political 
views, economic concerns and cultural threat perceptions of Trump’s nativist base of 
ethno-nationalist voters, where the influx of illegal immigrants into the US and the 
negative economic impact of globalization are of primary concern, rather than Russian 
actions in Ukraine or even the Kremlin’s interference with American elections (Kagan 
2018).  
 
Despite Trump’s frequent conceptual incoherence, poor attention to policy detail, at 
times, dysfunctional White House administration, personal moral deficiencies and 
abrasive public behavior he successfully ‘challenged the assumption that the pursuit of 
unipolarity serves average Americans’ (Beinart 2018). Trump’s radical departure from 
the status quo in both rhetoric and practice subsequently led to an erosion of the discursive 
dominance of the Washington consensus that has forced an intense debate on the future 
of US foreign policy in both major parties (Ashford and Thrall 2018). This may yet prove 
to be temporary disruption, or a more lasting shift where a strategic vision of American 
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nationalism underwritten by populist mobilization, post-truth politics, and nativist 
resentment gains political momentum, while the previous Washington consensus on 




This article has argued that American grand strategy constitutes an internal, hegemonic 
discourse that links notions of national identity to the conduct of foreign policy and 
national security, thus providing the ‘big picture’ of the national interest. Focusing on the 
interlinkage of discourse and practice in the study of American grand strategy allows for 
a more detailed examination into the domestic contextualization, politicization and 
polarization of strategic rationales, and how changes and continuities in US foreign and 
security policy are both legitimized and contested through the mobilization of ideas, 
concepts and narratives of national identity at the elite level.  
 
Since at least the end of the Cold War, a grand strategy vision of liberal hegemony has 
represented a broad ideological consensus of the Washington foreign policy 
establishment, resulting in a marked congruence between neoconservative intellectuals, 
liberal media outlets and centrist think tanks in their recommendations for America’s 
preferred world political role. However, within the elite network at the center of the 
American grand strategy debate, a significant challenger emerged under the Obama 
presidency in form of a countering discourse of restraint. Obama himself adopted some 
of the key arguments of the restraint discourse, as displayed in several of his foreign 
policy decisions, and in particular in respect to his use of force, resulting in the complex 
and contradictory nature of the Obama Doctrine, which oscillated between an America-
centric, hegemonic identity discourse and a post-American practice of hegemony.  
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Obama was operating under the normative constraints of a powerful discursive status quo 
in politics, expert circles and the media that did not allow for a more holistic reorientation 
of grand strategy given Obama’s own ideological and political preferences. As 
commander-in-chief Obama sought to modify rather than to replace the existing strategic 
paradigm, using the exceptionalist rhetoric of hegemonic continuity to augment a 
moderate policy change towards greater military caution and foreign policy pragmatism. 
This allowed his critics to contest his grand strategy on grounds of that very same identity 
discourse, attacking this strategic adjustment for being un-exceptional and therefore ‘un-
American’. The domestic controversy over the Obama Doctrine both exposed the 
discursive limits of grand strategy change within established identity paradigms and poses 
questions about how the tradeoffs between acknowledging international complexity and 
fulfilling the reductionist demands for identity narratives aimed at national self-
confirmation and reassurance can be reconciled. Here, the presidency of Donald Trump 
has heralded an at least temporary breakdown of the discursive dominance of liberal 
hegemony in the United States that has decidedly opted to prioritize the latter. 
 
In the eyes of the foreign policy establishment and key US allies Trump has threatened 
to undermine the very idea of American exceptionalism and the existence of an US-led 
liberal world order. Trump in turn has directly attacked America’s allies and partners 
abroad and targeted liberal elites at home as ‘enemies of the people’, advocating his 
populist nationalism as necessary break with a past that has neglected the interests of 
ordinary Americans. Both the Obama Doctrine and America First thus posed domestic 
challenges to the continuity of American liberal hegemony beyond external national 
security threats. Going forward, further avenues of research on American grand strategy 
should therefore consider the discursive construction of the identity-policy nexus, how 
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media, public opinion and political rhetoric interact and impact the prevailing meaning 
of national security and identity, and how the political relevance of the Washington 
consensus might be affected by the rise of populism in the United States. 
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